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Unmanned vehicles (UVs) are expected to be an integral part of the U.S. Navy’s 
expeditionary and carrier strike groups and are quickly being integrated into maritime 
operations.  Command and control issues must be resolved, however, in order to utilize 
unmanned systems as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. The purpose 
of this research was to assess the current doctrine of mission tasking with respect to 
tactical unmanned vehicles (UVs) and determine a method for effectively tasking these 
systems.  
The problem was analyzed by applying the factors of METT-T: mission, enemy, 
terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time available to UV-enabled 
maritime missions. The analysis identified specific implications for unmanned vehicles 
and emphasized important considerations for tasking and allocating UVs. METT-T 
analyses generally result in courses of action, however, tasking is a command and control 
issue, and therefore, four organizational structures emerge for tasking UVs 
A significant finding of this study is that the current doctrinal framework of the 
composite warfare commander’s concept can support tasking unmanned vehicles, but it 
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I. UNMANNED VEHICLES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 21st century Navy is undergoing transformation and is envisioned to look 
significantly different from the Navy of today. Operating under the concept of Network-
Centric Warfare (NCW), Naval forces will employ distributed sensors and integrated 
systems and platforms to provide a networked-force with the ability to share  “extremely 
rapid, high-volume transmission of digitized data,” as well as the capability for “precision 
strike and a common operational picture.”1 Many of the capabilities needed to implement 
NCW into the Fleet are still under development, but researchers foresee unmanned 
platforms as primary sensors that will compose the network.2 
Unmanned vehicles (UVs) are expected to be an integral part of the U.S. Navy’s 
future intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. As per the CNO’s 
guidance: 
…As part of Task Force ISR, develop a plan for increased use of 
unmanned systems for tactical ISR. Leverage extant UAV/UUV systems 
residing in other DoD components for maintenance, training, and 
support…Accelerate prototyping and experimentation of autonomous and 
semi-autonomous naval unmanned vehicles.3 
Offering tactical and operational capabilities while promising reduction in both 
cost of manpower and risk of casualties, UVs form a potential means of extending the 
reach of the military. Rapid growth of innovative technology makes realization of this 
ideal worth evaluation for changes in doctrine. Command and control (C2) issues for 
unmanned vehicles require resolution. 
The term command and control encompasses a wide variety of systems, 
processes, and functions and depending upon the author of the publication, varying 
                                                 
1 Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and Andrew L. Ross, Military Transformation and the Defense 
Industry After Next: The Defense Industrial Implications of the Network-Centric Warfare, (Naval War 
College, 2003), 6. 
2 Ibid., 8. 
3 Admiral Vern Clark, USN, CNO Guidance for 2004, [database online] (2004 [cited 28 April 2004] ) ; 
available from World Wide Web  @http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/clark-guidance2004.html  
1 
definitions. For the purpose of clarity, the joint definition of command and control will be 
used for this study: 
The exercise of authority and direction by a purposely designated 
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. 
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 
personnel, equipment communications, facilities, and procedures 
employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.4 
Command and control systems enable a commander to perform C2 functions and 
are comprised of three building blocks: processes, technology, and organizational 
structure.5 As depicted in Figure 1, there is much overlap among these entities.  
Modification to any of these entities will often result in change to the others.  
Figure 1.1 Command and Control System 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has invested over $4 billion in Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle(UAV) development , procurement and operations alone, with an estimated 
total of $10 billion spent by 2010.6  Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) and 
Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) research and development will add to this total, 
                                                 
4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
(Washington: GPO, 1987) . 
 
       5 Dr. Dan Boger, CC4913: Problems and Policies in C3, Naval Postgraduate School, March-June 
2004 
        6Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Roadmap 2000-2025, [database 
online] (2001 [cited 15 February 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2001/uavr0401.htm  
2 
greatly increasing the military’s inventory of unmanned systems. This change and growth 
in technology necessitates changes in the other building blocks, processes and 
organizational structures, of the command and control systems. For a commander to 
successfully exercise command and control over unmanned systems, processes and 
organizational structures must be in place to successfully integrate these assets into Fleet 
operation.  This study focuses on finding practical organizational structures with which to 
employ unmanned vehicles 
Changes in technology have historically driven military operational 
transformations. The advent of radar-guided missiles, nuclear propulsion, enhanced 
capabilities of the Tomahawk, and increased air-to-ground strike capability have all 
caused the U.S. Navy to re-examine its doctrinal structure.  Unmanned vehicles stand to 
do the same. In so much as “a truly innovative approach to employing a new system 
requires concurrent doctrinal, organizational, and technological changes that affect 
planning, equipping, and training military forces,”7 the Navy needs to be prepared to 
leverage and meet the changes presented by unmanned vehicles. 
B. BACKGROUND 
 The history of unmanned systems dates back to 1866 when Robert Whitehead 
designed the first unmanned underwater vehicle. Unlike UAVs, which emerged during 
WWII, serious progression in USV and UUV development did not occur until the 1960s. 
Nonetheless, UV development has progressed to the point where they are being 
assimilated into the Fleet, making DOD the world’s largest consumer of unmanned 
systems.8   
UVs are smaller, and lighter than before, and have often replaced humans in 
fulfilling 3-D missions, tasks that are considered “dull, dirty, and dangerous.”9 Dull tasks 
include flying a pattern for surveillance or reconnaissance, which is monotonous and 
                                                 
7 James R. Reinhardt, Jonathan James, and Edward Flannagan, “Future Employment of UAVS:Issues 
of Jointness,” Joint Force Quarterly, (Summer 1999), 39. 
8 Delbert C. Summey et al. Shaping the Future of Naval Warfare with Unmanned Systems, Coastal 
Systems Stations, Naval Surface Warfare Center, (July, 2001), 3-1. 
9 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Roadmap 2000-2025, [database online] 
(2001 [cited 15 February 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2001/uavr0401.htm 
3 
time-consuming for manned aircraft. UAVs are also used for surveillance of dangerous 
hostile areas and “can go into a dirty environment where there's the threat of exposure to 
nuclear, chemical or biological warfare.”10 In addition, UVs have replaced manned 
systems in many missions, alleviating the risk to personnel. An example of this is the use 
of UUVs for mine hunting and clearing. 
Currently, doctrine provides little specification in addressing command and 
control issues for UVs. In fact, Naval tactics only address issues concerning UAVS and 
do not provide a guideline for other unmanned systems, such as: Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicles (UUVs), and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs)11. Similarly, there is no 
formalized accounting for the growth and improvement in technology. Specifically, 
command and control issues, such as mission tasking, remain undefined and there is no 
focus on maritime missions.12 Technological and operational advances strongly suggest 
the need for an update.  
C.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
UVs are increasingly being integrated into tactical operations. Unmanned assets, 
such as the Predator and Global Hawk, are currently being used in Afghanistan and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), while a USV is deploying in the Arabian Gulf. The 
deployed UAVs are considered tactical assets, however, and are tasked by the Joint Force 
Air Component Commander (JFACC) while the USV is a prototype with limited 
capability and deploying alone. Nevertheless, technology continues to develop and 
enhanced capabilities are impending, yielding greater numbers of unmanned vehicles 
with increased abilities.  These UVs will be distributed with the strike groups in support 
of maritime missions. 
 Expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) combine the combat power of marine 
expeditionary units (MEUs) with the flexibility and strike capability of an amphibious 
                                                 
10 Sandy Riebling, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles”, in , par. 1[online database] (July, 2002 [cited 12 March 2004] ); 
available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.redstone.army.mil/pub_affairs/archive/2002/07Jul2002/articles/0718102142349.html 
11 ReinHardt et al. “ Future Employment of UAVS:Issues of Jointness,” Joint Force Quarterly, (Summer 1999), 
40. 
12 Joint Publication 3-55.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, August 27, 
1993. 
4 
ready group, and carriers strike groups (CSGs) are the current manifestation of carrier 
task forces. The terms, coined in the CNO’s guidance for 2003, replace the standard 
terms, amphibious ready groups (ARGs) and carrier battle groups.13 The ESG/CSG 
concept represents a highly mobile and flexible force that can be configured to 
accomplish a variety of missions. The strike groups also equip the fleet with a means of 
providing more coverage world-wide. “The ESG concept allows the Navy to field 12 
Expeditionary Strike Groups and 12 Carrier Battle Groups, in addition to surface action 
groups.”14 
 ESGs can be created based on any configuration of amphibious ships, cruisers, 
destroyers, submarines and P-3C Orions.  Similarly, CSGs would be composed of the 
same type of ships but configured around a carrier. The carrier or expeditionary strike 
group (CSG or ESG) organization is structured per the Composite Warfare Commander 
concept, consisting of warfare commanders who execute mission and warfare 
coordinators who allocate resources. The problem is: does the employment of unmanned 
vehicles (UVs) for maritime missions best fit into this framework or might it require a 
new structure?  
Tasking of UVs is not the same as for manned vehicles.  Pilots can prioritize 
given commands and there is a collaborative relationship between the controller and 
aircrew. This relationship is non-existent with UVs as they only do as ordered. 
Determining who should be tasked with a specific mission is an important command and 
control issue. Elements tasked for a specific mission, must have the ability, capability, 
and knowledge to complete the mission. Misallocation may delay timing, increase cost, 
and lead to loss of systems or personnel.  
Misallocation of resources may also result in over and under-utilization of assets. 
Under-utilization occurs when the personnel who actually use the asset are not given 
control or access to it while over-utilization arises when multiple commands need an 
asset that has no central tasking. For example, under-utilization might occur if an 
                                                 
13 "Carrier Strike Group ", par. 1 [database online] (May 2003 [cited 05 May 2004]); available from 
World Wide Web @ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/csg-intro.htm 
14 "Expeditionary Strike Group," par. 2 [database online] (May 2003 [cited 05 May 2004]); available 
from World Wide Web @ httphttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/esg.htm 
5 
unmanned surface vehicle were under tactical control of a submarine command. Over-
utilization might occur if a USV were allocated to more than one surface vessel for 
tasking.  With many units responsible for its tasking, the asset lacks direction and is 
potentially subject to conflicting taskings. This is a disconnect over who has tasking 
priority and generates confusion. It is therefore essential that a practical guideline be 
established for tasking unmanned vehicles.  
Tasking is a function of command relationships, the authority of a commander to 
perform responsibilities.  Within current operations, commanders receive missions from 
higher command authorities. They then decide how assets are to be employed, and task 
assets to execute plans to accomplish the mission. The commander who tasks assets has 
tactical control (TACON) over them and can direct assets as deemed fit. TACON is the 
authority to task forces for a limited and specified basis and is "usually limited to the 
detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to 
accomplish assigned missions or tasks.”15 TACON is a subset of the second command 
relationship, operational control (OPCON), a higher level command authority which is 
not limited in duration. OPCON is “the authority to perform those functions of command 
over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, 
assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to 
accomplish the mission.”16  
Support is the final command relationship to be discussed. Support is defined as 
“The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in 
accordance with a directive requiring such action.” 17 In a support relationship, the 
supported commander, the one who requests support, has TACON of the supporting 
command. An example of this can be seen in the tasking of an explosive ordinance 
disposal (EOD) unit. EOD detachments are OPCON to a numbered fleet commander but 
become TACON under the authority of whomever they support. Figure 1.2 below 
tionships. summarizes the command rela                                                 
15 Joint Publication 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," (February, 1995) 
 
16 Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 
(December, 2003) 
17 Ibid.  
6 
 Figure 1.2 Command Relationship Summary ([After Figure 5-1 MSTP 
Pamphlet 5-0.3, Part V, Key Terms and Graphics; available from World Wide Web 
[@ http://www.mstp.quantico.usmc.mil/publications/pamphlet5]) 
 
 The commander who exercises TACON does not necessarily have OPCON of the 
assets. An example of this can be seen in the joint targeting cycle. During this process, 
the JFACC serves as the centralized air commander for joint forces. The JFACC exhibits 
TACON over available air assets, such as the USMC’s FA-18s, although they are not 
attached to that command. Determining who has TACON of, and thus tasks UVs, is 
therefore an important command and control issue for determination. 
This thesis centers on the question: “What are the important considerations in 
determining who is best able to task unmanned vehicles and how this is accomplished?” 
The research assesses the current doctrine of mission tasking and attempts to apply it to 
unmanned vehicles (UVs). The objective is to analyze all reasonable alternatives, 
determine criteria for mission tasking in UVs and to develop a comprehensive and 
practical set of planning factors for unmanned systems. 
The scope of this thesis will be limited to the use of unmanned vehicles as strictly 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Only the unmanned vehicles 
used by naval forces; UAVs, UUVs, and USVs; will be discussed.  Focus will rest on the 
general capabilities exhibited by platforms but not specific vehicles.  Likewise, this study 
concentrates on the technology that is readily available for implementation. It addresses 
the implications of future systems or technology and joint operations, but not at length. 
This study focuses primarily on maritime operations or naval ships.   
 
7 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II, Mission Tasking and the Composite Warfare Commander Concept, 
outlines the current method of mission tasking. Specifically, it examines unmanned 
vehicles in the context of the current doctrinal framework of the composite warfare 
commander concept. In Chapter III, METT-T Analysis, a METT-T analysis is performed 
on employment of unmanned vehicles to find feasible courses of action (COA) for 
tasking UVs. Chapter IV discusses advantages and disadvantages of each COA 
determined in the previous chapter. Chapter V describes conclusions and 
recommendations for future work to enhance UV usability and summarizes ideas that 























II.  MISSION TASKING AND THE COMPOSITE WARFARE 
COMMANDER CONCEPT 
A.  MISSION TASKING 
In order analyze UV tasking issues; one must first understand the current 
organizational doctrine. The Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept is the 
foundation on which current command and control (C2) doctrine rests. This chapter 
provides an overview of doctrine and issues that require analysis in order to integrate 
UVs into the maritime missions. For the purpose of this study, the following definitions 
should also be considered: 
 Mission: The task together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the 
action to be taken and the reason therefore.18 
 Tasking Order: A method used to task and to disseminate to components, 
subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected targets 
and specific missions19 
Based on these definitions, we will use the term mission tasking to mean: 
 Mission Tasking: assigning a specific mission and/or projected targets to a 
subordinate commander to be accomplished without prescribing specifics. 
B.  COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMANDER DOCTRINE OVERVIEW 
The CWC concept was developed at the height of the Cold War to provide 
“standard procedures for command and control afloat”20 for the US Navy. The structure 
accommodated multi-mission manned platforms and advances in weaponry, sensors, and 
systems. It continues to evolve with the development, acquisition, and proliferation of 
technology as well as the evolution of asymmetric threats.21 
                                                 
18 Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 
(December, 2003) 
19 Ibid 
20 NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual 
21 Major T.D. Waldhauser, "Entering the Golden Age with the Composite Warfare/Amphibious 
Doctrine Dilemma", [database online] (1992 [cited  05 February 2004]); available from World Wide Web 
@ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/WTD.htm 
9 
 The basic organizational structure of the CWC is composed of warfare 
commanders who execute missions and warfare coordinators who allocate resources.  
The Officer in Tactical Command (OTC), equated to the CSG or ESG commander for 
this study, leads the force in prioritizing and accomplishing its missions. Tactical 
command is “the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under their 
command for the accomplishment of the mission.”22 Secondary to the OTC is the 
composite warfare commander (CWC) who “wages combat operations to counter threats 
to the force and to maintain tactical sea control with assets assigned.”23 CWC and OTC 
are generally the same command, but the doctrine allows for two separate individuals to 
hold the responsibility. This study treats them alike. 
 The OTC is responsible for five principal warfare areas; air defense, 
antisubmarine warfare, information warfare, strike warfare, and surface warfare; and can 
retain control of these warfare functions but generally delegates them to subordinates 
known as the principal warfare commanders (PWCs). Within a mission, the force 
performs specific duties that are often limited in duration. The OTC may assign these 
duties, such as mine warfare or underway replenishment, to a functional warfare 
commander (FWC) for completion. FWCs can be permanent or temporary based on the 
structure of the organization.  Coordinators are the last element of the high tactical level 
of command and control within the CWC structure depicted in Figure 2.1. They allocate 
resources based on tasking from PWCs or FWCs, execute policy and do not have tactical 
control over assigned assets. 24 
The CWC doctrine is highly functional and adaptable to many operations, 
Decentralized authority and command by negation are two main tenets of the CWC 
concept that allow for this flexibility.  Decentralized authority allows for a flexible 
command and control structure with division of work and minimal micro-management. 
Commanders are allowed and encouraged to initiate action autonomously while the CWC 
                                                 
22 NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual, 2-2 
23 Ibid. 2-3 
24 Ibid. 2-4 
10 
“oversees and coordinates these individual efforts”25 to successfully fulfill the mission.  
Command by negation enables subordinates to inform the commander of their plans, but 
does not require them to seek permission.26 A commander can stop the action of a 
subordinate at any point deemed necessary and can redirect forces as seen fit. This allows 
for faster decision-making, which is an essential factor in defeating an enemy in a 
dynamic environment. 
 




                                                 25 Major J. V. Medina, “Amphibious Warfare And The Composite Warfare Commander Concept:  Doctrine In 
Need Of Change,”  [database online] (1992, [cited 6 March 2004] ); available from World Wide Web@ 
accessed http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/MJV.htm 
26 Marine Corp Doctrine Publication-1, Warfighting, 87. 
11 
 
C. MISSION, COMMANDER’S INTENT, MAIN EFFORT 
Mission accomplishment is the driving force of all doctrine; the CWC is no 
exception. The objective to be accomplished, a mission, is composed of two parts: “the 
task to be accomplished and the reason (or purpose) behind it.”27 This reason or purpose 
is known as commander’s intent, which explains the why of the mission and gives 
subordinate commanders direction in shaping their plan of how the unit will accomplish 
the mission.28 Commander’s intent serves to unify the independent actions of the various 
warfare commanders, resulting in a cohesive force.  
Within the mission, there is often a central task that must be accomplished 
foremost or on which hinges the success of the mission. This task is known as the main 
effort. Top priority is given to this focal point and all units act in support of the main 
effort, directing the “weight of all combat power” towards it.29 The main effort will shift 
as the situation changes.   
This study defines allocation as the “distribution of limited resources among 
competing requirements for employment”30 Resources are allocated by coordinators to 
warfare commanders enabling them to accomplish the mission, based on the main effort. 
Priority is given to the main effort and then units that are directly supporting the main 
effort. 
D.  DO UNMANNED VEHICLES FIT WITHIN THE CWC? 
This study analyzes the alignment between tasking unmanned vehicles and the 
structure of the composite warfare commander concept, and considers whether tasking 
UVs fits current doctrine or necessitates change. In order to answer this question, one 
must consider the environment in which UVs are tasked. METT-T is an analysis tool 
used to evaluate command and control issues within missions. METT-T is an acronym 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 89. 
28 Ibid., 90. 
29 Ibid., 91. 
30 Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 
(December, 2003) 
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for: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available, and Time 
Available. 
The first element of a METT-T analysis is mission, which is an analysis of the 
task(s) to be completed. After identifying the main effort and other tasks needed for 
success, and initiating preparation for mission accomplishment, planners conduct an 
analysis of the enemy. Essentially this examines who the threat is, what they are doing or 
have done, when this occurred and the latest estimates of threat location.  In the context 
of threat location, strength and capabilities are examined. The next elements, terrain and 
weather, deal with the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of ones’ own forces 
with respect to the weather and operating environment.  The fifth element, troops and 
support available, considers skill and training levels of the force as well as the amount of 
resources necessary for mission accomplishment. The final element, time available, 
prioritizes tasks that must be completed for mission accomplishment and examines 
“critical time aspects of the operation.”31 The result of a METT-T analysis is the 
development of practical courses of action to accomplish the mission set forth. 
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps use METT-T to develop feasible, reasonable, 
and distinct courses of action by examining various factors that aid commanders in 
identifying essential tasks and assigning resources to accomplish those tasks.32 The next 
chapter will involve a METT-T analysis (as applicable) for UV-enabled ESGs and CSGs. 
The result of the analysis will yield feasible course(s) of action for tasking UVs.  
 







                                                 
31 U.S. Army Field Manual 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, Washington, D.C., (April, 1992)  
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III.  METT-T ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The problem of tasking unmanned vehicles is complex with multiple factors to 
consider. Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available, and 
Time Available (METT-T) is a systematic framework that enables determination of areas 
that are vital to mission accomplishment, and potential courses of action.  Performing the 
analysis yields specific elements to be addressed and aids in establishing criteria for 
mission tasking. It also decomposes tasking, allowing for objective evaluation of multi-
faceted problems. METT-T analyses result in distinct courses of action for a commander 
and supports tasking unmanned vehicles in an asset allocation plan. The objective of this 
study is to define the different organizational structures that can support asset allocation. 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the process that we are building for resource allocation.  
 
Figure 3.1 METT-T Analysis 
B. MISSION 
ESGs and CSGs task unmanned vehicles with maritime missions, including: 
maritime interception operations (MIO), anti-surface warfare (ASUW) targeting, force 
protection and, surface surveillance coverage (SSC) missions. Essential to these missions 
are building and maintaining the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP), which is also 




                                                 
33 LCDR Russell Gottfried, USN, Unmanned Vehicle Tactical Memorandum, [experiment proposal], 
Naval Postgraduate School, June 2004 
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1. Overview of Missions  
Maritime interception operations are the law enforcement arm of naval missions, 
and support UN sanctions, military operations, and international law.  Unmanned 
vehicles assist in surveillance of approach zones, and can provide topside awareness of 
boarded vessels during querying, boarding and searching. Force protection deals with a 
ship’s right and responsibility to protect itself from any and all threats. This is 
accomplished by taking measures to prevent attack or responding to attack should it 
occur. UVs can assist with early warning or disrupting an attack by small boats.                    
 
Figure 3.3 UV Scenario ([after Figure 18 in Naval UAV Operational Concept 
Document]) 
 
Generating and maintaining the recognized maritime picture is one of the most 
important missions of UVs in their ISR role. Through the use of various sensors, 
unmanned systems provide raw data pertaining to the area of operations. When analyzed, 
this refined data provides operators and decision makers with a processed picture of the 
area of interest and establishes situational awareness for the CWC.  Thus ESG or CSG 
collect information and disseminate it to all members of the battle group and higher levels 
of command as well. Surface Surveillance Coverage (SSC) also helps in building and 
maintaining the RMP. In SSC, ISR assets search the sea space surrounding the ESG/CSG 
for surface contact. Surface surveillance coverage allows potential threats to be 
neutralized before they can attack.  Should a surface contact be positively identified as a 
threat, surface warfare targeting attempts accurate location of threat contact in order to 
employ weapons.  
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The implication for unmanned vehicles is that near real-time intelligence is 
needed for the accomplishment of the maritime missions discussed above. Intelligence is 
the “product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, 
and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.” The 
intelligence cycle in Figure 3.2 shows the process, by which information is collected, 
converted to intelligence, and disseminated to various sources. Reconnaissance, 
Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) is a principal employment of UVs as 
collection assets, gathering relevant information about the enemy in support of maritime 
missions. 
MIO, SSC, ASUW targeting, and force protection compete for RSTA assets with 
the other principal warfare missions. Allocating resources to fulfill each mission becomes 
a strain on limited resources, and compete for use of collection assets that have multi-
mission capabilities. Prioritized tasking is required and must be established to allocate 
these resources.  
2. RSTA 
An understanding of the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 
missions, with which UVs would be tasked, provides insight into asset allocation courses 
of action. While both reconnaissance and surveillance are associated with gathering raw 
data, surveillance missions are more general and occur for an unlimited period of time. 
Reconnaissance missions focus on specific targets and are limited in duration. 
Reconnaissance and surveillance provide the commander with the information needed for 
mission accomplishment. 
Reconnaissance and surveillance missions support target acquisition, the detailed 
localization of a contact. Accuracy in location of the target as well as near-time 
transmission of this information is important for successful target acquisition. 34 For these 
missions, UV platform range and endurance are key performance characteristics under 
consideration to enable proper execution. 
 
 
                                                 
34 Major Anton Massinon, USA, Collection Tasking of the Corps Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-Short 
Range, (School of Advanced Military Studies, Kansas, 1993). 
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Figure 3.2 Intelligence Cycle ([From Figure 1-1 JP 2-02, National Intelligence 
Support to Joint Operations, SEP 98]) 
Range is the maximum distance at which a UV can operate and is a function of 
payload weight, fuel consumption, and endurance. It is also a function of camera 
resolution and sensitivity because data throughput decreases with range. Line of sight 
connectivity is also an issue. With as little exposure to the platform as possible, 
unmanned vehicles with sufficient range can locate or acquire targets.  Endurance 
pertains to the duration or quantity of time that an unmanned vehicle can operate before 
refueling. It is also a function of weight and fuel consumption, as well as engine 
performance. Transit time to and from the assigned area is also a factor in a total 
endurance calculation. UVs with suitable endurance can accomplish RSTA missions as 
required. The advantage of UVs is that they are unmanned and can be sent into dangerous 
environments with no risk or loss of personnel. Unmanned does not equate to 
expendable, however, and planning efforts to minimize vulnerability of these systems 
ensures the assets are available for subsequent tasking.  
C.  ENEMY 
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A scenario will be used to highlight important considerations for evaluating the 
enemy. 
 1. SCENARIO35 
Expeditionary Strike Group-Unnumbered, ESG-U, is sent to the Gulf to perform 
maritime missions. The strike group is also responsible for its own force protection while 
building and maintaining the RMP is a top priority. The strike group is centered on an 
amphibious assault ship and is comprised of one guided-missile cruiser responsible for air 
defense, an Aegis destroyer focused on maritime missions, and a nuclear attack 
submarine conducting precursor operations. Specifically, USS Destroyer is enforcing an 
embargo whereby suspicious ships are intercepted and inspected, USS Cruiser is 
conducting air defense in support of USS Amphib against any air attack, and USS 
Submarine is conducting pre-cursor operations for securing a border. Unmanned vehicles 
are embarked on both of the surface combatants as well as the submarine and are 
available for tasking. 
   In the above scenario, the area of responsibility is a cluttered environment with 
multiple contacts. These contacts can be critical contacts of interest (CCOI), friendly 
forces, neutral entities, and friendly forces. It is therefore necessary that unmanned 
systems possess the sensors that discriminate between targets. The sensors should be an 
EO camera that allows the GCS to visually identify the contact or an electronic system 
such as Identification Friend or Foe. Once an enemy or CCOI is identified, characteristics 
such as location, course and speed, capabilities, and size of enemy forces become 
important. In order to know the location of the enemy, unmanned systems must possess 
some form of global positioning system that allows the host platform to know the 
location of the UV, and in turn, the position of the enemy. Allocation of UVs will 
consider whether they have sufficient time on station to perform surveillance of these 
contacts in order to determine the size and capability of enemy forces. Specifically, in the 
case of the UVs tasked with MIO, sensors on board must have the resolution to allow the 
GCS to closely monitor shipboard activity.  
 
 
                                                 
35 All Use Case Scenarios taken from: Naval UAV Operational Concept Document, PMA-263 
Unmanned Vehicles Program Office, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Patuxent River, MD 
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D.  TERRAIN AND WEATHER 
 1. Operating Environment and Weather 
The naval doctrines, From the Sea, Forward…from the Sea, Operational 
Maneuver from the Sea, and, Sea Power 21 chart the shift in naval maritime strategy 
from blue water to a blue and brown water navy. This strategy calls for a flexibility and 
mobility to access anyplace on the globe; operate in the littoral regions, or in narrow seas 
lanes. This littoral strategy is designed to improve naval force missions of deterrence, 
forward presence, and strike warfare.36   Employing strike warfare, enforcing dominance 
of air space, and maintaining underwater awareness are complicated operation in littoral 
seas. This challenges any asset allocation process, much less on that is resource limited. 
Weather is an additional influence  
Whether it is the rare forecast combination of acceptable conditions for sea, air, 
and land operations that occurred on D-day or the drowning of Navy SEALS during 
violent thunderstorms in Grenada, weather can be an invaluable ally or a considerable 
opponent.37 It affects both the performance of troops and the technology that supports 
them. Meteorological effects are critical factors in UV operations and are therefore 
important considerations in mission tasking. 
Sea state, tides, and inclement weather such as rain and ice will all affect UV 
operations. The current UV platforms are not very robust and are particularly vulnerable 
to inclement weather. Specifically, decreased visibility will compress the range of 
unmanned systems. Similarly, UVs may be limited in endurance or unable to operate due 
to adverse weather conditions They are also dependent upon the host platform to provide 
optimal launch and recovery conditions. 
Meteorological factors also affect the sensors employed by unmanned systems, 
including radio propagation and radar detection. Many systems utilize RF via line of site 
for communication between the GCS and the UV. Precipitation causes attenuation of the 
signal and could result in a loss of communication with the UV.  Since, ESG groups are 
                                                 
36 Department of Defense, 1995 Annual Defense Report- Maritime Forces: Report of the Secretary of 
the Navy, [database online] par. 5 (Washington, D.C 1995 [cited 23 May 2004]),  available from World 
Wide Web @ http://www.pentagon.gov/execsec/adr95/navy_5.html 
37 G.R. Svoboda, Army Weather Support, [database online] (A. Deepak Publishing, 1986 [cited 05 
May 2004] available from World Wide Web @ http://www.atc.army.mil/meteorology/history.htm]  
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deployed all over the world in varying climates, it is essential that more robust platforms 
and weather-resistant sensors be developed for unmanned vehicles. “Weather and terrain 
conditions will dictate how to fight and what equipment is most effective to support the 
fighting force.”38 The impact of surface clutter and presence of precipitation diminish 
visual and infrared (IR) sensor effectiveness, as well. 
E.  TROOPS  
 Given the scenario, MIO, air defense, and precursor missions that UVs are to 
support, decision-makers assess unmanned system capabilities to assign them properly. 
UV capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations form the basis for analyzing troop and 
support availability. The platform is a primary component of the unmanned vehicle. It is 
the physical structure of the UV and exhibits capabilities such as speed, endurance, 
control, payload weight and survivability, which enable it to operate within a particular 
environment.39 Its size depends upon the payload weight, dimension, and desired time on 
station. Sensors are currently one of the most expensive components of unmanned 
vehicles and require specific platforms built around them. Payload drives the platform 
availability. More capable systems are much more limited in numbers. Table 3.1 
summarizes UV capabilities. 
1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles  
            UAVs such as Pioneer, Global Hawk, and Predator, have been used in Serbia, 
Afghanistan, and in Iraq. These high altitude and endurance (HAE) UAVs are expensive; 
but capable of handling multi-mission payloads. Considered strategic-level assets, they 
are tasked by the JFC via the air tasking order (ATO). The UAVs discussed in this thesis, 
however, are tactical-level vehicles that are just now deploying in maritime missions. The 
basic platform and payload planning considerations for UAVs extend to UUVs and USVs 
as well.                                                                                                                                                                  
    
 
                                                 
38 FM 3-5, Chapter 6:Effects of Environmental Conditions, par. 1 ([cited 13 May 2004]); available from World 
Wide Web @ http://www-nehc.med.navy.mil/nepmu2/pmttoolbox/Chem%20Bio%20Warfare_files/FM%203-
5%2C%20FMFM%2011-10%20NBC%20DECON/Ch-6.pdf 
39 DOD, UAV Roadmap 2002-Appendix A, Washington, D.C., April 2001 
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   a. Platform Characteristics 
          Survivability is a critical platform capability needed for unmanned 
vehicles. A highly survivable platform ensures the safety of the sensors. This is not to say 
that the platform must be indestructible, but simply implies that a platform should be 
robust to withstand various environments.   
                                
Figure 3.4 UV Capabilities in Support of Maritime Missions 
        
Adding stealth technology, materials or devices that decrease or disguise a 
vehicle’s signatures or emissions, enhances the survivability of the platform. Stealth 
enables unmanned vehicles to operate covertly, making them less vulnerable to attack. 
This also serves to increase the cost of the vehicle, making it a more precious asset and 
influencing its availability. 
Endurance entails the length of time that a vehicle can stay in operation 
before re-fueling. It is driven by fuel consumption and engine performance power. Time-
on-station is also a function of the battery life of sensors and control package. The current 
generation of UAVs has a proposed endurance of four hours in operation, which is 
sufficient to perform reconnaissance and surveillance missions, but may prove too short 
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for target acquisition. 40  In fact, these UAVs may be best suited to perform 
reconnaissance missions that are limited in duration. The current characteristics of UAVs 
support this type of operation more than surveillance missions. 
Control deals with how the UAV operates. UAVs are currently semi-
autonomous. They are launched and recovered by a crew but can operate on autopilot 
once in flight. As the technology continues to develop, UAVs will become more 
autonomous. The Tactical Control System (TCS), under development by the DOD as a 
ground control station for tactical UAVs, is designed to control multiple UAV payloads 
and disseminate gathered data to various C4I systems. It can potentially provide multiple 
platforms, ships and submarines, with control capability.41 For example, if a UAV is 
performing a RSTA mission, control could be switched to a ship in closer proximity to 
the UAV. Multiple platforms with control capability could also lead to conflicting asset 
requirements and strongly dictates the need for an established procedure for allocating 
unmanned vehicles.  
 The operating altitude of current tactical UAVs is 500-3000 ft, giving a 
maximum operating radius of 60 miles. Current speeds are 30-100kts. Altitude and speed 
of the unmanned system are limited by the weight and size of the vehicles. Engine 
performance also affects the speed of the vehicle. Shipboard operations are also an 
important aspect, considering the impact of host platform maneuvering on UAV 
operations. When ships are limited in changing its course or speed due to missions, or sea 
space, this restricts launch windows for UAVs. Access to flight competes with other 
ongoing helicopter or aircraft operations. Launch and recovery of unmanned vehicles 
may also be affected by wake turbulence generated by the moving ship, which will affect 
the wind patterns on the flight deck.  42 This could lead to unsuccessful launch or 
recovery, resulting in loss or damage to the UAV. 
 
                                                 
40 Ibid.  
41 U.S. Atlantic Command, UAV Tactical Control System: Joint Concept of Operations, [database 
online] (13 July 1998 [cited 15 June 2004]) available from World Wide Web @ 
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/conops1_2.pdf 
42 Ray Prouty,  Operations: Helicopters and Ships, in NASA Civil Helicopter Safety Column  
[database online] (September, 2001 [cited 30 March 2004] ); available from World Wide Web @ 
http://safecopter.arc.nasa.gov/ 
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b. Payload Capabilities 
Today, the most used sensors on UAVs are electro-optical (EO), Infrared 
(IR), and radar. Sensors are the means by which platforms locate targets or contacts of 
interest. The configuration of systems and sensors that enables the vehicle to accomplish 
RSTA missions is known as the payload. At a minimum, unmanned vehicles require 
electro-optical (EO) and IR cameras for reconnaissance and surveillance missions.  An 
EO/IR combination enables UVs to be employed during day and night operations. For 
target acquisition, UAVs need a moving target indicator (MTI) radar to track CCOIs 
effectively and provide accurate targeting capability.  While use of synthetic aperture 
radar allows sensors to operate in inclement weather and focus specifically on fixed 
targets, these again increase UV costs, which drives system availability. 
Some basic characteristics of the sensor that should be taken into account 
are field-of-view (FOV), resolution, and sensitivity. FOV involves the range of angles 
that a camera can view. Resolution deals with the ability of the optics to “distinguish 
separate objects or parts of an object within its field-of-view,”43 and sensitivity is an 
estimate of how fast the camera reacts to light. High sensitivity means that the camera 
does not need much contrast to capture an image. The range of the camera, combine with 
its resolution capability will limit the altitude of an unmanned vehicle. For RSTA 
missions, a wide FOV would enable the vehicle to cover a wider area. Also a high 
resolution would allow the camera to focus in on specific targets and a high sensitivity 
would yield a discernable signature even in clutter or low-contrast environments. 
2. Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
Like UAVs, USV extend the reach of naval sensors, yielding greater range for 
threat detection and extended AOR coverage. The characteristics of the Spartan Scout, a 
prototype currently undergoing operational testing, are examined for payload and 
platform considerations. 
a. Platform Characteristics 
This USV is small in size (7-11meters), which adds to its stealth and 
increases survivability. The small size of this USV also allows for greater speed and 
                                                 
43, Principles of Naval Weapons Systems, ed. CDR Joseph Hall, USN Kendall/Hunt Publishing 
Company: Dubuque, IA. 2000. 
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improved maneuverability.44  It operates on conventional sources of power, like diesel 
fuel, instead of being constrained by a battery at speed in excess of 40 knots with an 
endurance of 8 hours depending upon the speed and payload. Spartan Scout operates in 
heavy seas up to sea state three. Beyond this state, waves are larger than the height of eye 
of the platform, resulting in poor visibility.45 
b. Payload Capabilities 
This USV currently has the greatest payload capacity of today’s unmanned 
systems with the ability to carry up to 5000 pounds. EO, IR, and radar all make up the 
existing sensor package. 46 The height of eye, the distance from the surface of the water 
to the radar antenna, limits the radar range. Likewise, due to a low silhouette, USVs can 
get closer to a contact of interest with less chance of detection than UAVs and provide 
horizontal vice vertical imagery. 47  
3. Unmanned Undersea Vehicles 
 UUVs can provide early warning by using acoustics to identify CCOI engine 
noises. They can also provide tactical, stealthy signals intelligence (SIGINT) in forcible 
entry and access operations.  UUVs do not have the same depth and endurance 
limitations as humans and thus would be useful for gathering oceanographic data and 
mapping the ocean bottom.  UUVs can also accomplish shallow water missions, which 
would be harmful for submarines and surface vessels.48 
a. Platform Capabilities 
The upcoming crop of UUVs will be launched and recovery from 
submarine torpedo tubes. The undersea vehicle would have to weigh less than 5000 
pounds and be “approximately 21 inches in diameter, and 21 feet in length.”49  Likewise 
                                                 
44 Vittorio Ricci, Richard A. Erwin, and Benjamin S. Yates, Spartan Scout Unmanned Surface 
Vehicles Concept of Operations (CONOPRS), NUWC-NPT Technical Memo 02-080, July 2002 
45 Ibid. 
46 Michael Hundt, Unmanned Surface Vehicle for Assured Access and Force Protection, (12 August 
2002 [cited 31 May 2004]), available from World Wide Web 
@http://www.stl.nps.navy.mil/~brutzman/Savage/Robots/Spartan/hundt.SpartanSeaScoutNdia2002August
13.pdf 
47 Vittorio Ricci, Richard A. Erwin, and Benjamin S. Yates, Spartan Scout Unmanned Surface 
Vehicles Concept of Operations (CONOPRS), NUWC-NPT Technical Memo 02-080, July 2002 




current UUVs operate at speeds of 8kts, which would make them unsuitable for long 
range or time sensitive missions because of the large amount of transit time required. 
b. Payload Capabilities  
To perform reconnaissance and surveillance tasks, the UUV, like the USV 
and UAV, would need basic electro-optical and infrared for imagery intelligence. It 
would need the ability to transmit these images as well as the ability to communicate with 
its control stations. High latency, or throughput delay, restricts the communication ability 
of UUVs and further limits the missions with which it can be tasked. Sonar will be used 
to perform target acquisition and safely navigate. For covert surveillance and tracking of 
targets, passive sonar is available and SIGINT antennas would be used to intercept 
emissions from CCOIs. 50 
F.  TIME AVAILABLE  
Not all missions are time critical. For example, “dull” missions like flying a 
pattern for reconnaissance and surveillance are not limited in duration. For UVs, missions 
where there is hostile intent, “the threat of imminent use of force by a foreign force, 
terrorist(s), or organization against the United States, US national interests, or US forces” 
51 will be considered hostile. Missions such as air defense, particularly using UAVs as 
early warning launch and tracking of in bound missiles assets, are examples of time-
critical events, which require surveillance assets to acquire or locate the threat within a 
small window of time. The first critical time aspect occurs once a CCOI or missile is 
located. The image must then be sent to an analyst to be identified. Once this occurs, the 
control station must task the asset with tracking the missile or, if the missile is neutral, re-
task it to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance on another target. Figure 3.5 below is 
an example of tasking events that occur during the course of UV operations. 
The implication for unmanned vehicles is that they must be responsive assets. 
Unlike theater-level assets that are tasked via the air tasking order (ATO), a 24-hour 
                                                 
50Secretary of the Army,  1998 Army Science and Technology Master Plan, [database online] (1998 
[cited 21 March 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/army/docs/index.html 
51 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
(Washington: GPO, 1987)  
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tasking cycle, tactical unmanned vehicles will be deployed in dynamic environments and 
will often require quick tasking. 
 
Figure 3.5 Mission Tasking Data Flow 
To accomplish time-critical events, UVs must be designated as ALERT, on 
standby, ready for launch or on station, with the control team briefed and in watch spaces. 
UAVs and USVs are suitable for this designation. UUVs, however, are limited by slow 
speed and would be unsuitable for time-sensitive operations. Unmanned vehicles must 
have reactionary capability to reduce response time and accomplish time-sensitive 
operations 
G. RESOURCE ALLOCATION  
The analysis performed in this chapter highlighted unmanned vehicle mission 
tasking considerations summarized in Table 3.6. By identifying these considerations, 
practical means for allocating and tasking UVs can be developed. Resource allocation is 
the “distribution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment.” 52 
METT-T analysis reveals critical factors for UV mission tasking. These factors together 
provide a basic allocation scheme for distributing UV resources. There is no formal 
structure today within the CWC concept, however, to allocate these assets.  
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
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([Figure 3.6 Deductions from METT-T Analysis ([After Table 2.2 METT-T 
deductions, FM 7-20]) 
For the purpose of this discussion, effectiveness is defined as the right 
commander having TACON of the right UV for the appropriate mission. An example of 
effectiveness would be an air warfare commander who has TACON of a UAV asset and 
can task it in support of air defense missions. The air warfare commander (AWC) would 
be the “right” commander in this scenario because of designated authority, view of 
operating environment, and resource utilization. The AWC has a focus on and 
understanding of the UAV operating environment, which would ensure that assets are 
utilized in an appropriate manner.  
In contrast, AWC having TACON of a UUV or USV for air defense would 
constitute a mismatch. The AWC’s primary concern is with air defense and would 
therefore have little use for waterspace resources. This disconnect between mission and 
asset leads to ineffective tasking and under utilization of assets.  In the case of the 
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scenario presented above, the process would be efficient if the AWC were allocated 
resources in sufficient time to task the UAVs and have them carry out assigned tasks.  
1. Organizational Structures for Tasking Unmanned Vehicles 
Four distinct organizational structures that enable ESGs to task unmanned 
vehicles are introduced below for discussion in the following chapter. 
The CWC concept is comprised of warfare commanders who execute missions 
and element coordinators who allocate resources. Treating unmanned vehicles, as organic 
assets would use this concept. UVs would be allocated by element coordinators and then 
tasked by the warfare commanders to whom they are allocated. (1) In the first structure, 
the AREC allocates UAVs, the SCC allocates USVs, and the SOCA allocates UUVs. (2) 
The second structure develops a new element coordinator, the Unmanned Vehicle 
Element Coordinator (UVEC) responsible for allocating all UVs regardless of operating 
environment. (3) The third organizational structure for tasking UVs is platform-centric. 
UVs are organic to host platforms and tasked by the CO to execute shipboard missions. 
(4) The final organizational structure is the direct support option whereby unmanned 
vehicles are an extension of the CWC and tasked like an EOD or SEAL detachment 
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR TASKING UVS 
Three interwoven building blocks: technology, processes, and organizational 
structure compose the command and control function (see Figure 1.1).  Introducing 
unmanned vehicles into the fleet represents a change in technology, and as such, 
processes and organizational structures need to be developed that reflect these changes 
and allow the fleet to effectively and efficiently employ these resources. This chapter 
discusses four possible architectures for tasking UVs.  
Figure 4.1 below shows the tasking cycle. Available resources are allocated and 
then tasked. The commander to whom assets are allocated has the authority to task those 
resources. The four options are: (1) Platform-centric option, (2) Organic Option-Split 
Configuration, (3) Organic Option-UVEC configuration, or (4) Detachment option. 
 
Figure 4.1 Mission Tasking Cycle 
  
Mission management is an issue for consideration for all four structures. In the 
same vein that ongoing flight operations restrict the maneuverability of an aircraft 
Carrier, deploying unmanned vehicles does the same when deployed from a surface 
platform or submarine. From the scenario, deploying a USV from USS Cruiser 
potentially limits the maneuverability of the ship, which would limit the ship’s ability to 
provide air defense for USS Amphib. Changing the course and speed of the ship to 
prosecute air threats may not present appropriate flight conditions needed to recover any 
UV.  Sufficient planning on the part of the host platform may reduce these conflicts, but 
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not necessarily.  Similarly, the host platform will also have to coordinate with the 
resource and space managers to ensure that deploying UVs from the ship will not result 
in conflict with other strike group operations. 
1. Platform-Centric Option 
The platform-centric option is pictured in Figure 4.2 below. In this option, UVs 
are platform-centric assets tasked by the CO of the ship on which they are embarked; the 
unit commander has both OPCON and TACON of the assets. With regard to the scenario, 
all platforms have unmanned vehicles embarked. The CO of USS Cruiser might task 
embarked UVs with reconnaissance and surveillance in support of air defense, the CO of 
the submarine would task UVs with early warning tasks or force protections mission, and 
the CO of the destroyer would task UVs with RSTA in support of MIO. 
 




Direct UV control is an advantage of this structure. Currently, operators utilize a 
control station to maneuver unmanned vehicles. The host platform directly controls the 
UV. An advantage of this option is inherent in the CWC concept: command by negation. 
The CWC can re-direct assets to fulfill strike group missions as he sees fit. Likewise, the 
unit commander can task UVs in support of force protection or any other mission when 
not being tasked by the CWC. 
Flexibility is a drawback for this structure. UVs, as organic assets, are attached to 
a host platform regardless of utilization. For example, USS Cruiser would retain organic 
USVs although it would be unlikely to use them in support of its’ air defense missions. 
USS Destroyer, on the other hand, could use those USVs for force protection missions 
but has no control over or means to access the asset it requires. The lack of centralized 
tasking for this option necessitates that appropriate UVs are matched with platforms with 
suitable missions. 
2. Organic Asset Option (Split Configuration) 
In this organizational structure shown in Figure 4.3, UVs are organic assets 
attached to the ESG. UAVs are allocated by the AREC, USVs by the SCC and UUVs by 
the SOCA according to the CWC’s main effort. The warfare commander to whom these 
assets are allocated then tasks them and has TACON of the assets; while the CWC 
maintains OPCON.  The AREC is responsible for maintaining aircraft readiness and 
airspace planning. Warfare commanders submit air support requests for assets to the 
AREC. Based on the main effort, guidance, and priorities of the CWC, the AREC 
allocates the resources. AWC, located on USS Cruiser, would then task the allocated 
UAVs with ISR missions in support of air defense. USS Destroyer and Submarine would 
also task their UAVs as allocated resources dictated by AREC. They would receive UV 
support of their mission areas, as allocated by appropriate warfare commanders. 
A primary advantage of this organizational structure is that it is operational and 
doctrinally defined. SOCA, AREC, and SCC are already responsible for managing assets 
that fall within their realm of responsibility. Adding unmanned vehicles to the mix would 
not require much organizational re-alignment. Unmanned platforms, supporting systems 
and maintenance requirements require specification in the respective coordinator’s 
responsibilities section of CWC doctrine.  
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This structure keeps each element coordinator allocating assets within its’ area of 
expertise. For example, AREC’s primary focus is on air operations and airspace planning 
in maritime missions. In contrast, AREC has no authority in the undersea or surface 
operating environment and little, if any visibility.  The AREC’s designated authority, 
resource utilization, and view of the aerial operating environment make this the “right” 
staff to allocate UAVs. The same is true for SOCA and SCC with UUVs and USVs 
respectively.   
Figure 4.3 Organic Option (Split Configuration) 
 
One specific challenge to the organic option is that it requires more time to task 
assets than the platform and direct support options. In this option, coordinators manage 
resources for allocation to warfare commanders. They are solely asset and resource 
managers. For example, the AREC can tell the warfare commanders that the UAVs are 
unable to fly due to technical problems but does not have the authority to ground the 
assets. This option requires more time for tasking resources than the platform and direct 
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support options and may not be the most efficient means of tasking unmanned vehicles. 
Another important issue for consideration is communication. With this option, three 
different coordinators speak for unmanned vehicles. For instance, SOCA, AREC, and 
SCC would all be speaking to the UUVs, UAVs, and USVs located on a single host 
platform. This organization may add complexity to the allocation process. 
3. Organic Asset Option (UVEC configuration) 
 In this option, depicted in Figure 4.4, all UVs are allocated by a UV element 
coordinator (UVEC). The commander to whom the unmanned vehicles are allocated then 
tasks them. The CWC has OPCON and each warfare commander has TACON of assets. 
Many of the tradeoffs discussed for the split configuration organic option also hold for 
the UVEC configuration. One major difference is the unmanned vehicle element 
coordinator. Duties and responsibilities would have to be developed within CWC 
doctrine for this coordinator.  
Since unmanned vehicles are multi-mission assets that operate above, on, and 
below water, this role has a higher level of complexity. Unlike having a coordinator who 
has one area of responsibility, a UVEC manages and aligns assets in three different 
environments. The multi-mission capability coupled with the different operating 
environments make it difficult for one person to single-handedly manage and align all 
UVs and could potentially result in misallocation issues. 
Alternatively, this single point of contact makes resource apportionment very 
straightforward. The simplicity of this organization allows for the centralized 
management of UVs and streamlines tasking requests for warfare commanders. Likewise, 
the UVEC, with equal visibility of the air and waterspace, creates an interface among the 
operating environments. This also enables the CWC to address only one coordinator with 
respect to UV allocation issues. 
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 Figure 4.4 Organic Asset Option (UVEC Configuration) 
 
4. Direct Support Option 
This final option, shown in Figure 4.5, has the UVs as non-organic provided from 
a shore facility and available for tasking on request. CWC has TACON but not OPCON 
of assets and they are tasked similarly to a SEAL or EOD detachment. With regard to the 
scenario, the UV detachments are embarked in their launch platforms, but CWC directly 
tasks assets via the UV Officer in Charge (OIC) in the flagship.  
An advantage of this option is that it enables centralized control of the assets, and 
directly responds to the CWC. The OTC’s wider perspective ensures UVs support main 
effort and ultimately, mission accomplishment.  The direct support option is also a faster, 
more efficient means of tasking unmanned vehicles. This organizational structure might 
best accomplish time-sensitive operations in a dynamic environment where UVs require 
quick tasking, or flexibility to change tasking to fulfill missions. 
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 Figure 4.5 Direct Support Option 
For this organizational structure to be effective, the UVs need to be capable assets 
that the ESG/CSG commander would actually task. A resource that is severely restricted 
by weather and other operating conditions would not be utilized much by a strike group. 
Thus, this option relies heavily on UV capabilities. As technology continues to improve 
and UVs become more proficient in certain areas, the direct support option will become a 
more feasible option.  
A. NAVY MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LISTS  
A framework for evaluating and determining which structure is best for a 
particular mission may be derived from the Navy Mission Essential Task List (NMETL).  
NMETL specifies “those tasks considered essential to accomplish and support [assigned] 
missions”, along with the variables in the environment that can affect the performance of 
a given task, it provides measures of performance that can be applied by a commander to 
set a standard of expected results.53  
                                                 
53 CNO, Universal Naval Task List (UNTL),[database online] ( March 2001 [cited 30 May 2004]); 
available from World Wide Web @ http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/Directives/3500/ch-1.pdf 
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The scope and standards of performance given for each task make Mission 
Essential Task Lists (METLs) a valuable training and evaluation tool.  Analysis 
highlights specific preparation and resources needed to complete that task, and 
commanders can assign assets accordingly. In fact, “the purpose of the METL is to assure 
alignment between a unit's mission and its training status.”54 Forces train to accomplish 
mission essential tasks. Resources are limited, however, and COs must further prioritize 
the METL to ensure that appropriate resources are allocated for mission accomplishment. 
In this manner, commanders can evaluate organizational effectiveness by using the 
measures of performance given with each task to assess their unit’s readiness.   
The four organizational structures presented above are all practical options for 
allocating unmanned vehicles and each has associated advantages and disadvantages. 
One structure, however, may work best for a specific mission while another may work 
best in another situation. It is essential that ESG and CSG staffs war-game UV C2 
options to determine which one best suits the personalities at play and the specific 




                                                 
54 U.S. Army, ECP 2.2 Training and Training Records, [database online] ([cited 16 June 2004]); 




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
With the expected growth in the role of UVs in maritime mission, CSG and ESG 
staffs need to anticipate allocation processes for these assets and adoption of the 
appropriate framework to task them. This research has resulted in four organizational 
structures for allocating and tasking unmanned vehicles. These structures are the 
platform-centric option, direct support option, organic option-split configuration, and 
organic option-UVEC configuration. The platform-centric option allows the CO of the 
host platform to directly task UVs in support of specified missions while the CWC/OTC 
tasks detached unmanned vehicles in the direct support option. For the organic option, 
element coordinators allocated UVs to warfare commanders, who then task them.   
 The organizational structures were developed by application of METT-T to UV 
enabled maritime missions. The problem was analyzed by applying the factors of METT-
T: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time available 
to unmanned vehicles. The analysis identified specific implications for unmanned 
vehicles and emphasized important considerations for tasking and allocating UVs. 
Specifically, it highlighted the requirements necessary to accomplish the mission of 
tasking UVs as summarized in Figure 3.6. METT-T analyses generally result in courses 
of action, possible plans to accomplish the assigned mission. 55   However since tasking is 
a command and control issue, four organizational structures emerge for tasking UVs. The 
advantages and disadvantages or each structure are shown in Table 5.1. 
Command and control systems are the means by which commanders accomplish 
missions. An effective C2 system results when the three dimensions, processes, 
technology and organizational structures, are developed in tandem. As UV technology 
evolves, concurrent development and implementation of processes and organizational 
structures must occur before these systems are deployed with strike groups. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The organizational structures presented in this thesis should be tested 
operationally to validate their feasibility as viable options for tasking unmanned vehicles.  
                                                 
55 U.S. Army Field Manual 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, Washington, D.C., (April, 1992) 
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Expeditionary and carrier strike groups should determine which structure enables them to 
best task unmanned vehicles through war-gaming the organizations in simulated 
operations, or trying out different structures during training exercises, using NMETLs as 
OPTIONS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
1. Platform 
Centric 
Direct UV Control, CO can 
task unmanned vehicles in 
support of ship’s missions 
CWC can re-task if/when 
necessary. 
Lacks Flexibility. UVs remain 
under TACON of host platform 




doctrinally defined, element 
coordinator has designated 
authority, view of operating 
environment, and resource 
utilization 
Requires more time to task 
assets. Communication conflicts 
with three different element 




Single point of contact 
makes apportionment 
straightforward, streamlines 
tasking requests, adds a 
layer of interface between 
operating environments. 
Simplicity of organization 
 
Requires development of UVEC. 
Duties and responsibilities must 
be specified in CWC manual. 
Difficult for one person to align 
multi-mission capable assets that 
operate in three different 
environments. Requires more 
time to task assets. 
Communication conflicts with 
three different element 
coordinators speaking for UVs 
 
4.Direct Support Enables centralized control of assets, Faster, more 
efficient means of tasking 
UVs 
Highly UV dependent. UVs need 
to be a capable asset for the 
CWC to task it. 
Table 5.1 Summary of Advantages and Disadvantages 
measures of performance. Likewise, personality and leadership style of the OTC/CWC 
will influence the option chose by each strike group. The appropriate forum for this 
activity is war gaming among strike groups staffs. 
 Lessons learned from using unmanned systems in ongoing operations should be 
taken into consideration when evaluating the effectiveness of these structures. Finally, as 
UV capabilities progress, the advantages and disadvantages presented in this thesis 
should be re-evaluated.   
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